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Summary  findings
Social capital-in  the form of general trust and strong  (represented in the World Value Surveys), they found
civic norms that call for cooperation  when large-scale  that societies with greater trust tended to have
collective action is needed-can  inmprove  government  governments that performed significantly better. The
performance in three ways:  authors used survey measures of citizen confidence in
* It can broaden government accountability, making  government as well as subjective indicators of
government responsive to citizens at large rather than to  bureaucratic inefficiency.
narrow interests.  Knack further analyzes links between social capital and
* It can facilitate agreement where political  government performance using data for the United
preferences are polarized.  States. In states with more social capital (as measured by
*  It is associated with greater innovation when  an index of trust, volunteering, and census response),
policymakers face new' challenges.  government performance is rated higher, based on
Consistent with these arguments, Putniam (1993) has  ratings constructed by the Government Performance
shown that regional governments in the more trusting,  Project.
more civic-minded northern  and central parts of Italy  This result is highly robust to including a variety of
provide public services more effectively than do those in  control variables, considering the possibility of influential
the less trusting, less civic-minded southern regions.  outlying values, treating the performance ratings as
Using cross-country data, La Porta and others (1  997) and  ordinal rather than cardinal, and correcting for possible
Knack and Keefer (1997) obtained  findings consistent  endogeneity.
with Putnam's evidence. For samples of about 30 nations
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Putnam (1993) has shown that regional governments  in the more-trusting, more
civic-minded northern and central parts of Italy provide public services more effectively
than do those in the less-trusting,  less civic southern regions. Using cross-country data,
La Porta et al. (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997) obtained findings consistent with
Putnam's evidence. For samples of about 30 nations represented in the World Value
Surveys, they found that higher-trust societies tended to have significantly better
performing governments,  using survey measures of citizen confidence in governnent as
well as subjective indicators of bureaucratic efficiency.
This study extends  the analysis of links between social capital and governmental
performance  to the American states. In states with more social capital--as measured by
an index of trust, volunteering  and census response--governmental  performance is rated
more highly, using ratings constructed by the Government  Performance Project. This
result is highly robust to (1) inclusion of a variety of control variables, (2) consideration
of the possibility of influential outlying values, (3) treating the performance ratings as
ordinal rather than cardinal, and (4) corrections for possible endogeneity.
These findings have potential relevance for development issues, because the
efficient delivery of public services can directly affect welfare, and because good
governance is associated with better economic performance (e.g. Knack and Keefer,
1995). However, understanding the importance of social capital tells us very little about
how to increase it. More research is needed on what interventions, if any, can build
generalized trust and strong civic norms.Section 2 sunmarizes related literature, and arguments for how social capital
influences government  performance. Sections 3 and 4 respectively provide detailed
information on the measures of government performance  and social capital used in the
empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses other determinants of governmental  performance
that are controlled  for in the analysis. Section 6 reports results, and section 7 summarizes
the findings.
2. Background
In their classic book, Almond and Verba (1963: 3) argue that the performance  of
democratic government depends on "civic culture," defined as "the ways in which
political elites make decisions, their norms and attitudes, as well as the norms and
attitudes of the ordinary citizen, his relation to government and to his fellow citizens..."
They note that "theorists of democracy from Aristotle to Bryce" have stressed that well-
functioning democratic governnent requires "a widespread sense of civic responsibility."
Building on Almond and Verba (1963) and on Banfield's (1958) work on "amoral
familism,"  Putnam (1993) linked  interpersonal trust and  other dimensions of "social
capital" to the efficiency and  responsiveness of democratic government across Italian
regions: "In the civic regions of Italy... social trust has long been a key ingredient  in the
ethos that has sustained  economic  dynamism and government  performance"  (p. 170).
There are three major ways in  which social capital can improve governmental
performance. First, it can broaden governmental accountability, so that government  must
be responsive to citizens at large rather than to narrow interests.  Second, it can facilitate
2agreement where political preferences are polarized.  Third, it is associated with greater
innovation  in policymaking  in the face of new challenges.
Holding governments  accountable is arguably the most important means by which
social capital influences performance. Greater trust and more civicminded attitudes can
improve governmental performance by  affecting the  level  and  character of  political
participation,  reducing  "rent-seeking"  and  enhancing  public-interested  behavior.
Knowledge of politics and public affairs by large numbers of citizens, coupled with their
participation through voting and other modes of citizen voice, are important potential
checks on the ability of politicians and bureaucrats  to enrich themselves or narrow interests
that they are allied with.  But narrowly self-interested  citizens may find it rational not to
vote, or to attend meetings or protest rallies, or even to acquire information about the
performance  of public officials. Where  trust is higher, voters can more easily overcome the
collective  action problem in monitoring officials. As Putnam (2000: 346) writes:  "Citizens
in civic communities  expect better government,  and (in part through their own efforts) they
get it... if decision makers expect citizens to hold them politically accountable, they are
more inclined to temper their worst impulses  rather than face public protests." In less civic
regions, citizens "more commonly assume the role of alienated and cynical supplicants"
(Putnam, 1993: 182).  Where too many citizens "free ride" on the other hand, by being
uninformed and unwilling to write letters or otherwise protest government malfeasance,
public officials can more easily indulge in patronage practices and other inefficient policies
that serve narrow interests.
Government officials may need less monitoring in the first place in higher-trust
states with a widespread sense of civic responsibility, if public employees are broadly
3representative of the populations from which they are drawn. Where high-level officials,
their subordinates, and the public all carry high expectations of mutual competence and
probity, a cooperative equilibrium  is more likely to be produced  in which incompetent or
dishonest behavior is more likely  to be detected and less likely to be tolerated.
Consistent with these arguments  on improving accountability,  Putnam (1993) found
that in the more civic regions of Italy, citizen-initiated  contacts with government officials
tended  to  concern  public  issues,  while  in  the  less  civic  regions,  such  contacts
"overwhelmingly involve requests for jobs and patronage" (Putnam, 1993: 101).  In the
more civic regions, citizens viewed government as a provider of necessary public goods
from which everyone could benefit, while citizens of less civic regions viewed government
as a source of private goods.
4n addition to making government more accountable, social capital can reduce
inefficiencies  associated with polarization. Putnam (1993: 105) found political leaders in
the more civic regions of Italy to be more willing to compromise with their political
opponents.  Where trust and norms of reciprocity are stronger, opposing sides are more
likely to agree on the ground rules for seeking debate and resolution of disagreements
(Putnam, 2000:  339-344).  Where fewer citizens are motivated by  a  sense  of  civic
obligation to stay inforned and to participate in political life, the extremes on the political
spectrum are more  likely to dominate the  public agenda, and debate becomes more
polarized. Putnam (2000: 342) in fact has found that declines in participation  (in local civic
organizations, political parties, writing to newspapers, etc.) in the U.S. in recent decades
have been concentrated arnong political moderates, with almost no decline observed for
persons on either end of the ideological  spectrum.
4There is also evidence  linking social capital to greater innovation and flexibility in
policymaking. Putnam (1993) found that the more civic regions in Italy were much more
successful than the less civic regions in  responding to  newly-identified problems and
challenges  in the areas of day care programs, family clinics,  job training centers, promotion
of investment and economic development, and setting environmental standards.  Where
citizens are less public-spirited,  politics is more likely to be dominated  by elites that  resist
policy change.  Where an absence of trust and a sense of civic obligation make politics
more  divisive  and  polarized, it  may  be  more  difficult to  agree  on  adoption  and
implementation  of policies  responding  to new challenges  or crises.
Consistent with all of these arguments, Putnam (1993) has shown that regional
governments in the more-trusting, more civic-minded northern and central parts of Italy
provide,  public services more effectively than  do those in the less-trusting, less civic
southern regions.  Using cross-country  data, La Porta et al. (1997) and Knack and Keefer
(1997) obtained findings consistent  with Putnam's (1993) evidence  from the Italian regions.
For samples of about 30 nations represented in the World Value Surveys, they found that
higher-trust societies tended to have significantly better performing governments, using
survey measures of citizen confidence in government as well as subjective indicators of
bureaucratic  efficiency.
This  paper  conducts analyses  of  social  capital's  impact  on  governmental
performance in  the U.S.  states.  Results strongly indicate that social capital matters.
Namely, where interpersonal  trust is higher and citizens demonstrate  a greater sense of civic
responsibility,  governments  perform  better.
5Rice and Sumberg (1997) also  analyze cross-state differences in goverunental
performance as a function of "civic culture."  This analysis differs from theirs in several
important ways.  First, the measure of governmental  performance  used here is a relatively
technocratic one, as explained in the next section, assessing the details of financial and
capital management, human resource policies, etc.  Rice and Sumberg use an index that
reflects ideology more than it reflects performance  in a technocratic  sense. One of the three
components  of their index is an indicator of policy liberalism,  while another is a measure of
policy "creativity" (each of these components is itself a composite of several indicators).
Their civic culture index also differs substantially  from the social capital index used here; it
is constructed using public sector outcomes such as public library books per capita, the
percentage of public school teachers who are men, the percentage of state legislators who
are women, and crime rates. Finally, their set of control  variables is different from that used
here, and  they do  not  address the  potential for  reverse causation from  government
performance  to civic culture.
3. Measuring State Government  Performance
The quality of state governments' management practices were rated in the
February 1999 issue of Governing magazine (Barrett and Greene, 1999). Ratings were
produced by the Government  Performance Project, a joint effort of Governing magazine
and the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.
On a scale of A to F, governments for each of the 50 states are graded on their
"overall performnance,"  as well as on five specific dimensions  of performance: financial
6management, capital management, human resources, "managing for results," and
information technology. These assessments were based on detailed information provided
by 49 state governments (all but California) in response to a survey questionnaire, and on
almost 1000 in-person interviews of budget officers,  public managers, auditors,
academics, and legislative aides.
A total of 35 explicit criteria were used in making judgements on performance.
For example, among the 13 criteria used to assess financial management are accuracy  of
revenue and expenditure forecasts, structural balance between revenues and expenditures,
prudent management of long-term debt, multi-year perspective  on budgeting, timeliness
of budget adoption', adequacy of financial audits, and effectiveness  of procurement
management. The four criteria under "managing for results" include existence  of a
strategic plan, involvement of stakeholders in the development of strategic plans, and the
effective use of performance  data for policy making, management and evaluation of
progress.
The 35 criteria reflect reasonably well the three major ways, outlined above, in
which social capital can improve governmental performance. For example, timely
adoption of budgets and prudent debt management can each be derailed where opposing
interests resist compromise (e.g. Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Alt and Lowry, 1994; Berg
and Sachs, 1988). Adequacy of financial auditing, effective  procurement management,
budgets that reflect policy priorities, involvement of stakeholders in the development  of
strategic plans, and the communication of performance  results to stakeholders all reflect
'"Budget promptness" was one of the components of Putnam's (1993) index of performance for Italian
regional  governments.
7strong accountability  processes. Flexibility and innovation in policymaking are reflected
in the seven information technology criteria 2, the six human resource management criteria
(which stress the use of incentives for performance,  and flexibility in hiring and
promotion), and criteria in each of the five dimensions  which emphasize long-range
planning. The feasibility of flexible personnel and procurement rules depends on having
employees and managers with a sense of public responsibility, who can be trusted to not
take advantage of flexible rules for their own personal  benefit.
In this study, the "overall performance"  ratings are used as the primary dependent
variable, converting the A, A-, B+ etc. letter grade scale to a numerical scale with a
maximum possible value of 12 for an A and a minimum possible value of I for an F.3
The lowest actual grade is a D (for Alabama), while the highest grade assigned was an A-
(for MO, UT, VA and WA). The median grade was a B-.  Figure I depicts the
distribution of grades among the states. Results will also be presented for each of the five
dimensions of performance.
In addition to the indicators produced by the Government Performance Project, a
final dependent variable is the "reinventing government" implementation index
constructed by Brudney et al. (1999). This index is based on survey responses from
1,229 heads or directors of state government agencies in the 50 states. Administrators
were asked the extent to which their agency had implemented over the last four years
each of 11 changes, in the areas of training programs to improve services, quality
2 Two of the information  technology criteria address the ability of IT systems to generate data that are
useful to managers and to transmit it effectively. Similarly, Putnam's (1993: 67-68) index of government
effectiveness in the Italian regions included an indicator  of statistical and informnation  services, including
facilities for data collection, statistical processing, and computer-based analysis.
As will be shown, results are robust to treating the letter  grades as an ordinal rather than interval scale.
8improvement  programs, benchmarks for measuring results, strategic  planning, systems
for measuring client satisfaction, simplification  of personnel rules, increasing managerial
discretion to transfer or carry over funds, privatization  of programs, flattening  the
agency's structure,  decentralizing decision making, and greater discretion in procurement.
Florida (two standard deviations above the mean) earned the highest score on the
"reinventing government" index, with Alabama ranked lowest (nearly two standard
deviations below the mean).
There is quite a bit of conceptual overlap between these 11 items and the 35
criteria  judged in the Government Performance Project. The Brudney et al. index is
correlated with the overall performance grade at .29 (significant at .04). The greatest
conceptual overlap is with the "managing for results" dimension. Not surprisingly,
"managing for results" is more highly correlated with the Brudney et al. index (.37) than
are any of the other four dimensions covered by the Government Performance  Project.
While statistically significant, the correlations  between the Brudney et al. index and the
performance  grades are rather modest. The absence of a stronger relationship  may be
attributable to the fact that the Brudney et al. index considers only changes  in the 1990-94
period, while Government Performance  Project grades can reflect the impact of reforms
made before, during, and after that period (up to 1999). Because of the limited scope of
the Brudney et al. index, it is used below only as a supplement to the Government
Performance Project grades, which are analyzed in greater depth.
4. Measuring Social Capital
9A state-level social capital is constructed from three indicators. The first is a
measure of interpersonal trust, closely related to the trust measure used by La Porta et al.
(1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997). This variable is the percentage  of a state's survey
respondents who agree with the statement  that "most people are honest." Several studies
have shown that higher levels of trust as measured by survey items such as this one
reflect environments in which trustworthy behavior is more frequently exhibited (e.g.,
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnamn,  2000: 347-348).
These survey data on honesty perceptions were kindly provided  by Robert
Putnam, and were originally collected for DDB Needham, an advertising firm, from a
series of surveys conducted by the commercial  polling firm Market  Facts.  Each of these
national surveys includes about 3500 respondents, but with only a small, non-
representative sample for each state. However, the data from this annual survey were
accumulated over 1975-97,  with changing sampling units over time so that respondents in
a particular state are not drawn from the same small corner of the state year after year. A
series of validity tests performed by Putnam (2000) strongly suggest that the data are
representative of states' populations. Data on the trust variable are available for the 48
continental states. The mean value is 66.8%, with a low value of 54% (Mississippi) and a
high value of 74.5% (Vermont).
The second social capital indicator used in the analysis is based on actual behavior
reflecting a sense of civic responsibility, rather than on survey attitudes. Households
were asked to mail in their 1990 census forms by April 1, 1990. The Census Bureau
calculated mail-in response rates for each state as of April 28, 1990, shortly before field
enumeration efforts began. Mail-in response rates were used by the Census Bureau as its
10indicator of the level of citizen cooperation  with the 1990 census. Mailing in the census
form saves one's fellow taxpayers the costs of expensive enumeration  efforts; the lower-
than-anticipated mail-in response for the 1990 census necessitated  the hiring of far more
enumerators than originally planned by the Census Bureau. Mailing in the census form
can thus be viewed as a public good for all Americans. Cooperating  with the census can
also be viewed as a public good at the state level. A brochure  accompanying  the census
form mailed to households noted that participation with the census would "help make
sure your community gets its fair share of federal and state funding" and that census
counts "are used to decide how many members of Congress your state sends" to
Washington (Thompson 1991). In a national survey on "good citizenship" issues
conducted by USA Today in 1990, 71.6% of respondents cited responding to the census
as a characteristic of good citizenship. Analyses of cooperation  with the census using
individual-level data view mail response as "a form of community  involvement,
reflecting a sense of civic obligation  that also motivates such behavior as voting, serving
on juries, and paying taxes" (Couper et al., 1998). Census response is thus a reasonable
proxy for civicminded attitudes and cooperation that are hypothesized  to improve
governmental  performance. 4
Census response rates for 1990 are available for all 50 states. The mean value is
74.2%, with a low of 62% (Alaska) and a high of 84.1% (Wisconsin). Census response is
correlated at .43 (significant at .002) with the survey-based measure of trust.
'Note  that  no  claim  is being  made  that  higher  census  response  rates,  however  they  are  obtained,  will
necessarily  improve  governmental  performance.  Increasing  census  response  by  offering  monetary
payments  would  simply  make  it a less  useful  proxy  for  civic  cooperation.
11The third social capital variable measures the percentage  of each state's residents
who engaged in volunteer activity during the previous year, based on responses to the
May 1989 Current Population Survey, conducted by the Census Bureau. 5 Data are
available for all states but Hawaii and Nevada. Values average 23. 1% and range from
13.9% (New York) to 38.9% (North Dakota). Volunteering  is correlated with trust at .68
(significant at .0001) and with census response at .44 (significant  at .002).
Each of the three social capital indicators was standardized  to have a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of one. A social capital index was created by taking the mean of
the three standardized  variables. Cronbach's alpha for the index is .76. The index varies
from a low value of -1.43 for Mississippi to a high value of 1.65 for North Dakota.
Values for volunteering  were imputed for Hawaii and Nevada, and for trust for
Hawaii,and Alaska, using regressions of each social capital indicator on the others. As
shown below, however, results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these states in the
analysis.
5. Other Determinants of Government Performance
In testing the impact of social capital, the analysis controls for other potential
determinants of state governmental  performance. Higher-income  citizens with better
education may be more effective in demanding more efficient government. Income and
education can also have "supply side" effects on government performance: a larger tax
base might make it easier to offer higher salaries or to  purchase an expensive computer
5 The data were generously provided by Meg Haist. Jennings and Haist (2000) find that indexes of civic
engagement and civic capital which incorporate this volunteering measure are negatively associated with
12systems, while a more educated  workforce provides a larger  pool of talent from which
government agencies can recruit. Therefore, the log of per capita income and percent of
adults with a high school diploma are included in the regressions. Income ranges from a
low of $17,471 (log=9.77)  for Mississippi to a high of $33,189 (log=10.41) for
Connecticut. High school graduates averages 76.3%, and ranges from 64.3%
(Mississippi) to 86.6% (Alaska).
For given mean values of income and education,  a larger population also provides
a larger tax base and a larger pool of educated workers. For these reasons, the analysis
also controls for the log of state population, which ranges from 13.08 for Wyoming (with
a population of 480,000) to 17.27 for California (population of more than 31 million).
A larger population can also make governing  more difficult, however, other things
equal. oAs  Governing (February 1999, p. 18) noted of California  and New York, "neither
can seem to finish its budget on time."  Larger states tend to have more numerous and
diverse interests--economic  and otherwise--potentially  making it more difficult to arrive
at a consensus regarding taxation, expenditure, public investment,  and human resource
policies, as well as on the institutions and procedures used in formulating and
implementing policies. 6 The net effect of population on government performance is
ambiguous in light of these positive and negative effects.
The analysis also controls for two variables reflecting  the potential for polarized
preferences. Numerous theorists  have argued that greater political and social cleavages
rates  of economic  growth  among  the states.
6 The analysis intentionally  does not attempt to control for the various channels through which social
capital and demographic factors may influence government performance  (such as constitutional rules,
voting participation, and the density and character of interest groups). Investigating which of these or other
13make effective governance more difficult. 7 Racial heterogeneity is one such potential
source of polarization. Racial heterogeneity is measured here as the percentage of a
state's population which is African American, because the white-black difference is still
the most salient racial division in most of the country. No state has an African- American
majority, so a natural measure of heterogeneity is the relative size of this minority among
the states. Data are available from the Census Bureau  for 1996. The lowest value is
Montana's 0.3%, and the highest is Mississippi's 35.9%.
Inequality is another potential source of polarization. Therefore, the analysis
controls for the Gini coefficient of income inequality, which can in principle vary from 0
(perfect equality) to 100 (one family has all of a state's income). Data are from the
Census Bureau, and reflect the distribution of family income in 1989. New Hampshire
had the most egalitarian distribution of income with a Gini of 34.4, while Louisiana had
the most unequal, with a Gini of 44.6.  The mean value among the states was 39.5.
Interest group density and diversity could improve public sector performance
through increasing government accountability. On the other hand, if the goals of these
groups often conflict with efficiency, government efficiency could suffer where density
of interest groups is greater. Diversity of interest representation might also signify
greater polarization of interests and preferences, making governing more difficult. The
net effect of interest density and diversity are therefore ambiguous.
Interest group density and diversity for 1990 are taken from Gray and Lowery
(1996).  "Density" is defined as the number of registered interest organizations  in each
variables mediate the relationship between social capital and government performance is left for future
research.
14state, and "diversity" is defined as a Herfindahl  index of concentration based on the
distribution of interest groups among ten categories  of economic and social activity.
Both density and diversity are greater, as expected,  are significantly in states with larger
economies. Therefore, these variables were adjusted by taking the deviation from values
predicted from a regression of each on aggregate  state income (per capita income
multiplied by population). 8 However, results reported below are not sensitive to using the
raw rather than adjusted values for density and diversity of interest groups.
Finally, a dummy is included to reflect the Governor's political party
(Democrat=1 for the 17 states with Democratic governors). This variable controls  for
several possible influences. First, it could control for possible bias in the ratings
associated with partisanship. For example, if the raters are themselves mostly Democrats,
the ratings could tend to favor states administered  by Democratic governors. Second,
governors of one or the other party may have been more aggressive in implementing
"reinventing government" reforms. Historically,  Republicans in state and local
governments were more associated with progressive reforms while Democrats,
particularly in the South, were more associated with patronage. On the other hand, the
identification  of "reinventing government" initiatives  with Vice-President Gore at the
federal level may have encouraged similar initiatives by Democratic governors at the
state level.
7 For example,  Alesina  and  Drazen  (1991). Also  see  the discussion  in Putnam  (1993:  116).
Aggregate  state  income  explains  9%  of the variation  in  diversity  (t-statistic  = 2.13)  and  46%  of the
variation  in  density  (t-statistic  = 6.37). Simply  dividing  the interest  group  variables  by aggregate  state
income,  as Gray  and Lowery  (1996)  did for density,  entails  the very  strong  assumption  that  they  increase
proportionately  with  economic  activity.
156. Results
The simple correlation of the social capita index with the overall performance
grade from the Government Performance  Project is .43 (significant at .002). Equation I
of Table 2 presents strong evidence from a multivariate analysis that social capital is
conducive to government performance. Controlling for the other determinants,  the social
capital index is positively and significantly associated with the quality of government.
The coefficient of 1.21 indicates  that a one-unit increase in the index (i.e. a 1  -standard-
deviation increase on average among the three index components) is associated with a
more than 1-point  increment in the performance  scale, e.g. from a grade of B- to a grade
of B. Figure 2 depicts this partial relationship between the social capital index and the
government performance measure in a scatterplot. 9
v  In contrast to the strong association  with social capital, neither income nor
education are significant determinants  of government performance. Although income
and education are correlated with each other at .4 1, their lack of significance is not
attributable to multicollinearity: neither variable approaches significance even when the
other variable is omitted from the regression.'° Education is correlated with the social
capita index at .47, but remains insignificant  even when the social capital index is omitted
from the regression. The weak impact of income and education on performance  is
consistent with Putnam's (1993: 98, 118) results for Italian regional governments.
9 Because  Figure  2 is a partial  plot,  the slope  of the least-squares  line  shown  in the figure  equals  the social
capital  index  coefficient  reported  in  equation  1.
'° Income  remains  insignificant,  and  results  on other  variables  are unaffected,  if income  is divided  by a
state  cost  of living  index  estimated  for 1995  by Berry  et al. (2000).
16Population is positively and significantly associated with performance,  consistent
with the possibility of economies of scale in governing. Each standard-deviation  increase
in the log of population (1.01) is associated with an increase of two-thirds in the
performance grade in equation L.11
Percent African American population is positively associated with government
performance. The coefficient in equation 1 implies that a rise of about 11  percentage
points (about 1.5 standard deviations) in the African American population share is
associated with a 1-point increment in the performance scale. These results suggest that
racial polarization does not pose an obstacle to effective governing.' 2
Income inequality has the expected negative coefficient, but is significant  at the
.05 level only for a one-tailed test. Each 3-point rise in the Gini index of income
inequality is associated with a 1-point  drop in government performance.
Neither of the interest group variables is significant. This finding is consistent
with the possibility that interest group density and diversity do not matter, but also with
the possibility that each of these variables has both positive and negative effects that
roughly offset each other.
The Democratic governor dummy is not significant. In results not shown in Table
2, other measures of partisanship are also not significant, including the Democratic share
of state legislators, and the percent of voters who identify with the Democratic  rather than
the Republican party (measured  by exit polling data for 1996 from Voter News Services)
" Using a very different measure of government  performance, Rice and Sumberg (1997) also found that
larger populations improve performance  and that income and education have no effect.
12 Because a larger African-American population  always represents greater racial heterogeneity in the state
data, it is impossible to disentangle the effects of heterogeneity from the effects of more African
Americans.
17Conceivably, it is not which party that controls government  that matters for
performance,  but whether or not either party dominates. Polarized  preferences and
interests may be greater where states' populations are split roughly equally between
supporting either of the two major parties.  Where a single party controls the legislature
and the govemorship, necessary  adjustments to fiscal crises may be more rapid (Poterba,
1994; Alt and Lowry, 1994). On the other hand, effective competition between two
healthy and well-organized  parties can help keep state government more accountable.
Governments in one-party states (as in less democratic countries)  may be more corrupt
and less efficient. Empirical results (not shown in Table 2) testing several altemative
measures indicated that the partisan balance is not a significant  determinant of
government performance. The partisan balance was measured as the absolute value of
the difference in party identification  between the Democrats and Republicans (from 1996
exit polls), by the absolute value of the difference in the Democratic  and Republican
share of state legislators' seats, by a dummy coded I for states with lower and upper
chambers controlled by different parties, and by a dummy coded 1 when the Governor
was of one party and at least one chamber was controlled by the other party. None of
these variables turn out to be significant  when added to equations I and 2, and their
inclusion does not affect the results for the social capital variables.' 3
Results for the social capital index also prove robust to the inclusion of "political
culture" variables. Inclusion of these "individualist," "moralist" and traditionalist"
measures, using dummy variables based on classifications by Elazar (1966) or indexes
t3 Putnam  (1993: 116-117)  similarly  found  little  evidence  that  the performance  of regional  governments  in
Italy  was adversely  affected  by various  measures  of social  or political  fragmentation,  polarization,  or
18constructed by Johnson (1976),  does not contribute significantly  to the explanation of
cross-state differences in state government performance. Similarly,  a dummy for ex-
Confederate states is insignificant  when added, and its inclusion  does not affect the
estimated relationship between government performance  and social capital.
Equation 2 replicates  the first equation, but omitting the three states (AK, HI, and
NV) missing data on one or more of the components of the social capital index. Results
are virtually identical to those obtained for the full sample.
Equation 3 replicates the first equation, but employing robust regression
techniques that downweight the influence of outliers. The coefficient for the social
capital index changes very little; although the standard error rises somewhat, the index is
still significant at the .02 level.
,Equations 4 and 5 differ from the first equation in using exogenous instruments
for the social capital index. Conceivably,  better-performing state governments produce
more honest, trusting and trustworthy citizens with a better-developed  sense of civic
responsibility. If government  does its job well, communities  run more smoothly, with
less crime and social strife, generating  more trust and civic cooperation. To the extent
that causation might run in this direction, from government  performance  to social capital,
results for the social capital variables in equations 1-3 do not by themselves represent
convincing support for the Putnam hypothesis.
Accordingly, equations 4 and 5 estimate the impact of social capital on
government performance  using two-stage least squares to correct for possible
conflict.
19endogeneity. Instruments  used in equation 4 are percent homeowners' 4 and percent of the
population with Scandinavian  ancestry.' 5 These instruments  are very effective in
explaining cross-state  differences in social capital in first-stage equations. The other
right-hand-side variables in the model, in the absence of these instruments, explain 66%
of the variation in the social capital index (see Table 3, equation 1). With the addition of
the two instruments, 85% of the variation is explained  (Table 3, equation 2).  Both
homeownership  and percent Scandinavian  ancestry are significant at the .001 level in
these first-stage regressions. The instruments are also valid in the sense that they do not
influence government  performance independently of their effect on social capital, as
evidenced by a p value of .65 in a test of overidentifying  restrictions for the 2SLS
regression.
,In equation 4 of Table 2, the coefficient for the social capital index is very similar
to those in the other equations, suggesting that there is little if any reverse causation from
government performance  to levels of social capital. If reverse causation biased the OLS
coefficient for the social capital index upward, the coefficient estimated using 2SLS in
equation 4 should be smaller than the coefficients estimated using OLS in equation 1.
Equation 5 of Table 2 reports 2SLS results in which religious composition of the
states is used for an alternative set of instruments, instead of homeownership and
Scandinavian ancestry. Putnam (2000: chapter 4) discusses  the greater involvement of
14Data  are  for 1980,  from  the  Census  Bureau.  Rates  vary  from  New  York's  48.6%  to West  Virginia's
73.6%.  Using  survey  data,  DiPasquale  and  Glaeser  (1999)  find  empirical  support  for  their  hypothesis  that
homeownership  encourages  the  formation  of social  capital.
'5 Data  were  kindly  provided  by  Robert  Putnam.  Values  range  from  0.4%  for West  Virginia  to  26%  for
North  Dakota.  Using  survey  data,  Rice  and Feldman  (1997)  show  that interpersonal  trust  is strongly
influenced  by  trust  levels  of one's  country  of ancestry.  The  Scandinavian  nations  have  the  highest  level  of
trust,  as  measured  by  World  Values  Survey  data  (Knack  and  Keefer,  1997).
20mainline Protestant  churches in the wider civic community,  relative to the greater
emphasis on church-centered  activities of evangelical  Protestant, Catholic and other
churches." 6 Using data from Bradley (1992) and denominational  classifications  from
Green et al. (1996), "adherents" as a share of the state population'7  was calculated  for
mainline Protestant, evangelical/fundamentalist  Protestant, African American
Protestant,' 8 Catholic,  Eastern Orthodox, and Mormon churches. A seventh variable, from
the same source, is an estimate of the number of Jewish Americans in each state. As
expected, more mainline Protestants are strongly associated with a higher level of social
capital (t-statistic = 7.8). A 17 percentage-point  increase in mainline Protestants as a
share of state population is associated with an increase of a full standard deviation in the
social capital index. The religious composition variables explain most of the cross-state
variation in the social capital index not already explained  by the other righthand-side
variables in the model (see equation 3 of Table 3). They also easily pass a test of
overidentification,  with a p value of .40. Finally, the part of social capital predicted by
these exogeneous  instruments is significantly associated with stronger government
performance, as show in equation 5 of Table 2.
16 Putnam  (1993)  and Verba  et al. (1995)  discuss  the implications  of Protestant-Catholic  differences  in
hierarchical  vs. congregational  organization,  lay  participation  in  the clergy,  and in congregation  size  for the
acquisition  of civic  skills  and interpersonal  trust. Using  cross-country  data,  La Porta et al. (1997)  use
religious  composition  to instrument  for interpersonal  trust,  classifying  the Catholic,  Eastern  Orthodox  and
Muslim  religions  as "hierarchical  religions"  with  inimical  effects  on trust.
17 Church  "members"  as well  as "adherents"  are enumerated  in  the data. However,  there  are no data  on
members  of some  churches  (most  notably  Catholic),  so adherents  is used. The major  drawback  to using
adherents  is that  the number  of adherents  of Catholic  churches  in Rhode  Island  constitutes  126%  of the
state's population.
"s  African-American  Protestant  refers  to members  of churches  that  are overwhelmingly  African  American;
many  African  Americans  attend  churches  of predominantly  white  Protestant  denominations,  and  are
included  among  the adherents  of those  denominations.
21Equation 6 of Table 2 reports results that differ from equation I in using ordered
logit instead of OLS. If differences among the grades are not equivalent in magnitude
(for example, if the difference between a C- and C represents a larger gap in actual
performance  than the difference between a B- and B), ordered logit would be more
appropriate  than OLS, because it assumes only ordinal and not interval-level  properties.
The disadvantage  of ordered logit is that the coefficients are much more difficult to
interpret in terms of marginal effects on the dependent variable. Effects of the social
capital variables on government performance  prove robust to using ordered logit in
equation 6.  The only notable difference with the OLS results in equations 1 and 2 is that
income inequality is now significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test.
Table 4 presents OLS results for each of the five dimensions of governmental
performance  that are separately rated by the Government Performance Project. The
social capital index is significantly associated with significantly improved performance in
the areas of financial management (equation 1), capital management (equation 2), and
information technology (equation 5). For human resources (equation 3), the social capital
index is significant  at the .09 level (two-tailed  test). Social capital in unrelated  to
performance in the area of "managing for results" (equation 4).
Among the other regressors, income inequality appears to have particularly severe
implications for financial management, consistent with literature linking social
polarization to difficulties in responding to budget crises (Alt and Lowry, 1994; Alesina
and Drazen, 1991; Berg and Sachs, 1988). Per capita income is significantly  but
negatively related to human resource performance  - perhaps because it is easier to hire
new employees, and to discipline and terminate unproductive workers, where low per
22capita income makes government employment  more attractive. The number of interest
groups is positively and significantly related  to performance in the areas of financial
management and managing for results. The role of interest groups in keeping
government accountable appears to outweigh  any negative impacts on performance
associated with special interest lobbying. Interest group diversity, however, is
significantly and negatively associated with managing for results.
Equation 6 of Table 4 reports results for the Brudney et al. (1999) "reinventing
government" index. The explanatory power of this regression (adjusted RP  = .20) is
weaker than for the overall Government Performance Project grade (adjusted R 2 = .33),
perhaps because it measures only those reforms which were implemented  during a
particular four-year period, from 1990 to 1994. The social capital and population
coefficients are significant, but only at the .07 level (for two-tailed tests). The
reinventing government index has been standardized  to have a mean of 0 and standard
deviation of 1. The social capital coefficient  thus indicates that a standard-deviation
increase in the social capital index is associated with a rise ofjust over one third of a
standard deviation in the reinventing government index. Among the other regressors, the
number of interest groups is positively and significantly associated with implementation
of reinventing  government reforms.
7. Summary
This analysis of cross-states differences  within the U.S. provides strong evidence
for the Putnam hypothesis that levels of social capital influence governmental
performance. These results are consistent  with evidence provided by Putnam (1993) for
23the Italian regions, by La Porta et al. (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997) from cross-
country data, and by Rice and Sumberg (1997) for the U.S. states (the latter using very
different measures of government  performance and social capital). Unlike most of those
studies, this analysis corrects for the possibility of reverse causation from government
performance  to levels of social capital." 9
Using an index based on interpersonal  trust, census mail-in response rates, and
volunteering,  social capital is found to be a significant  predictor of governmental
performance,  as assessed by the Government  Performance Project of Governing
magazine and the Maxwell School. Results are robust to the addition of numerous
control variables, to consideration  of the possibility of influential outlying values, to
treating the performance ratings as ordinal rather than cardinal,  and to corrections for
possible endogeneity.
The impact of social capital on government performance  demonstated in this
paper, and in Putnam (1993), La Porta et al. (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997), have
potential relevance for less developed nations. The efficient delivery of public services
can directly affect welfare, and good governance has been shown to be associated with
higher rates of investment and growth in incomes (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1995).
However,  there is a large gap between  understanding the importance  of social capital for
development,  and identifying  interventions  that are likely to build generalized trust and
strong civic norms in less developed nations.
'9 Putnam  presents  evidence  that  differences  in social  capital  across  Italian  regions  are of long  standing,
and preceded  differences  in  governmental  performance  that emerged  only  when  important  responsibilities
were  devolved  to a newly  created  set of elected  regional  governments  in the early 1970s.
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26Table 1
Summary statistics
Variable  N  Mean  Std. dev.  Minimum  Maximum
Overall performance grade  50  7.6  1.8  3  11
Social capital index  50  0  .80  -1.43  1.66
Honesty perceptions (%)  48  66.8  4.4  54.0  74.5
Volunteering (%)  48  23.2  6.7  13.9  38.6
Census response (%)  50  74.2  4.7  62.0  84.1
Log per capita income, 1996  50  10.04  0.14  9.77  10.41
High school graduates, 1990 (%)  50  76.3  5.61  64.3  86.6
Log population, 1996  50  14.99  1.01  13.08  17.27
African American pop. (%)  50  9.9  9.4  0.3  35.9
Gini, income inequality, 1989  50  39.5  2.2  34.4  44.6
Interest groups, 1990  50  587  456  107  2969
Interest groups (residual)  50  0  336  -636  1933
Diversity of interest groups  50  .130  .009  .110  .151
Diversity (residual)  50  0  .009  -.018  .021
Democratic governor dummy  50  .34  .48  0  1
Scandinavian ancestry  (%)  50  4.2  5.4  0.4  26.0
Homeownership %, 1980  50  66.6  5.4  48.6  73.6
Mainline Protestant (%)  50  12.1  7.2  1.6  36.5
Evangelical Protestant(%)  50  15.9  11.9  2.2  43.9
African-American  Prot.(%)  50  3.3  3.7  .03  13.8
Catholic (%)  50  37.8  26.6  4.5  126.2
Eastern Orthodox (%)  50  .05  .15  0  .10
Mormon (%)  50  3.2  10.7  .14  71.8
Jewish (%)  50  1.3  1.9  0  10.2
27Table 2
Determinants  of State Governmental  Performance (Overall Grade)
Equation  1  2  3  4  5  6
OLS  OLS  Robust  2SLS  2SLS  Ordered
regression  Logit
Social capital index  1.210**  1.300**  1.122*  1.254*  1.477**  1.577**
(0.333)  (0.370)  (0.481)  (0.629)  (0.536)  (0.565)
Log of per capita  -1.337  -1.320  -1.787  -1.266  -0.910  -2.620
income, 1996  (2.061)  (2.098)  (2.277)  (2.292)  (2.238)  (2.712)
High school  0.021  0.015  0.009  0.020  0.015  0.034
diploma (percent)  (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.076)
Log population,  0.663*  0.660*  0.618  0.624  0.576  0.906*
1996  (0.255)  (0.279)  (0.326)  (0.327)  (0.320)  (0.390)
African American  0.090**  0.089**  0.097**  0.091*  0.096**  0.140**
population (percent)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.047)
Gini income  -0.324  -0.311  -0.344  -0.313  -0.258  -0.509*
inequality, 1990  (0.173)  (0.188)  (0.198)  (0.217)  (0.202)  (0.247)
Number of interest  .0006  .0005  .0005  .0006  .0005  .0007
groups (residual)  (.0007)  (.0007)  (.0007)  (.0007)  (.0007)  (.0009)
Diversity of interest  -15.485  -14.714  -11.593  -14.658  -10.687  -16.287
groups (residual)  (28.787)  (30.830)  (31.901)  (31.586)  (31.143)  (36.719)
Democratic  0.098  0.175  0.185  0.115  0.197  0.117
governor (dummy)  (0.678)  (0.744)  (0.545)  (0.547)  (0.535)  (0.725)
Constant  21.815  21.168  28.199  20.871  16.149  --
(22.659)  (23.248)  (23.546)  (24.360)  (23.413)
N  50  47  50  50  50  50
Adj. R2/Pseudo R 2 .33  .29  --  .30  .33  .17
Mean dep. var.  7.6  7.7  7.6  7.6  7.6  7.6
SEE  1.5  1.5  --  1.5  1.5  --
Dependent variable is grade for overall state government performance. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. A * (**) indicates significance at .05 (.01) for 2-tailed
tests. Note R2  does not have its usual interpretation  in 2SLS.
28Table 3
First-stage regressions for Table 1, 2SLS equations 4 and 5
Dependent variable: Social capital index
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Equation  1  2  3
Homeownership  0.054** (0.015)
Scandinavian  ancestry  0.068** (0.012)
Mainline Protestant  5.879** (0.749)
Evangelical  Protestant  0.777 (0.878)
African-American  Prot.  -14.294** (4.433)
Catholic  0.686 (0.360)
Eastern Orthodox  -96.528* (43.149)
Mormon  1.253*  (0.537)
Jewish  -4.581 (3.952)
Log of per capita income  -1.597* (0.696)  0.168 (0.630)  -1.331* (0.614)
High school diploma  0.022 (0.019)  0.021 (0.063)  0.043**  (0.013)
Log population, 1996  0.216* (0.100)  0.194** (0.072)  0.207** (0.057)
African American pop.  0.024* (0.011)  0.020* (0.008)  0.031 (0.017)
Gini income inequality  -0.245** (0.042)  -0.114* (0.044)  -0.138** (0.038)
Interest groups (residual)  .0003 (.0002)  -.0001 (.0002)  .00020 (.00014)
Interest diversity (resid.)  -11.092 (5.623)  -8.972 (7.061)  -11.092 (5.623)
Democratic governor  -17.929 (9.973)  -0.139 (0.121)  -0.099 (0.108)
Constant  21.177 (6.895)  -5.395 (7.630)  11.628  (6.275)
R  2  .66  .85  .92
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. A * (**) indicates significance  at .05
(.01) for 2-tailed  tests.  Sample size is 50.
29Table 4
Determinants  of State Governmental Perfornance
5 Dimensions and "Reinventing Government"  Index
Equation  1  2  3  4  5  6
Financial  Capital  Human  Managing  Infornation  Reinventing
Performance  mgmt.  mgmt.  resources  for results  technology  Government
Dimension
Social capital index  0.829*  1.320**  1.163  0.297  1.717**  0.353
(0.391)  (0.633)  (0.660)  (0.599)  (0.579)  (0.189)
Log of per capita  -2.273  2.549  -4.893**  -1.366  -0.265  -0.311
income, 1996  (2.269)  (3.042)  (1.656)  (2.913)  (2.899)  (1.507)
High school  -0.058  0.002  0.081  0.109  -0.048  0.042
diploma (percent)  (0.060)  (0.102)  (0.064)  (0.086)  (0.076)  (0.026)
Log population,  0.525  0.008  0.556  0.772  0.942*  0.309
1996  (0.318)  (0.339)  (0.281)  (0.391)  (0.379)  (0.166)
African American  0.086**  0.1  17**  0.098*  0.061  0.050  0.001
population (percent)  (0.031)  (0.052)  (0.038)  (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.022)
Gini income  -0.637**  -0.406  -0.195  -0.210  -0.234  0.107
inequality, 1990  (0.205)  (0.299)  (0.242)  (0.255)  (0.214)  (0.125)
Number of interest  .0017*  .0003  .0003  .0023  *  *  -.0003  .0007*
groups (residuall  (.0007)  (.0008)  (.0007)  (.0008)  (.0008)  (.0003)
Diversity of interest  -45.259  -36.305  11.556  -72.327*  -0.268  -12.033
groups (residual)  (25.584)  (42.217)  (31.002)  (33.606)  (48.349)  (16.415)
Democratic  -0.332  -0.505  0.506  0.740  0.020  -0.262
governor (dummy)  (0.665)  (1.044)  (0.648)  (0.863)  (0.741)  (0.277)
Constant  52.395  -2.673  48.812  8.057  7.584  -8.867
(24.622)  (31.564)  (18.079)  (29.575)  (30.548)  (16.272)
Adj. R2/PseudoR 2 .37  .19  .27  .19  .22  .20
Mean dep. var.  8.6  8.2  7.6  6.8  7.6  0
SEE  1.6  2.2  1.6  2.1  1.5  .89
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. A * (**) indicates significance at .05
(.01) for 2-tailed tests. Samnple  size is 50 in all regressions.
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